We defend a view of the distinction between the normal and the pathological according to which that distinction has an objective, biological component. We accept that there is a normative component to the concept of disease, especially as applied to human beings. Nevertheless, an organism cannot be in a pathological state unless something has gone wrong for that organism from a purely biological point of view. Biology, we argue, recognises two sources of biological normativity, which jointly generate four “ways of (...) going wrong” from a biological perspective. These findings show why previous attempts to provide objective criteria for pathology have fallen short: Biological science recognizes a broader range of ways in which living things can do better or worse than has previously been recognized in the philosophy of medicine. (shrink)

The authors analyze results of a survey of members of the Columbia University Graduate School of Business classes of 1953–1987 in order to assess the potential effectiveness of firms' ethics training programs. Results suggest that such training has a positive effect, but that relatively few firms provide such programs (about one-third of the respondents worked for firms with such programs). Although the sample is not representative of American employees and managers generally, the results suggest that it may be worthwhile for (...) firms to provide formal ethics training to their employees. (shrink)

Michael Huemer has argued for the justification principle known as phenomenal conservativism by employing a transcendental argument that claims all attempts to reject phenomenal conservativism ultimately are doomed to self-defeat. My contribution presents two independent arguments against the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism after briefly presenting Huemer’s account of phenomenal conservativism and the justification for the self-defeat argument. My first argument suggests some ways that philosophers may reject Huemer’s premise that all justified beliefs are formed on the basis of seemings. (...) In the second argument I contend that phenomenal conservativism is not a well-motivated account of internal justification, which is a further reason to reject the self-defeat argument. Consequently, the self-defeat argument fails to show that rejecting phenomenal conservativism inevitably leads one to a self-defeating position. (shrink)

The paper examines the question of whether a person could know the difference between right and wrong and have the capacity to control his or her conduct yet not be moved by his or her knowledge of right or wrong. It proceeds by considering psychopathy and inquiring into the nature of the psychopath's cognitive deficits, if any. One possibility is that psychopaths are inconsistent in the sense of Kant's test of universalizability. This possibility is rejected after considerable argument. A second (...) possibility is that psychopaths are incapable of empathy. Consideration of recent work in developmental psychology leads to the conclusion that this possibility remains open. (shrink)

Emotions, Values, and the Law brings together ten of John Deigh's essays written over the past fifteen years. In the first five essays, Deigh ask questions about the nature of emotions and the relation of evaluative judgment to the intentionality of emotions, and critically examines the cognitivist theories of emotion that have dominated philosophy and psychology over the past thirty years. A central criticism of these theories is that they do not satisfactorily account for the emotions of babies or (...) animals other than human beings. Drawing on this criticism, Deigh develops an alternative theory of the intentionality of emotions on which the education of emotions explains how human emotions, which innately contain no evaluative thought, come to have evaluative judgments as their principal cognitive component. The second group of five essays challenge the idea of the voluntary as essential to understanding moral responsibility, moral commitment, political obligation, and other moral and political phenomena that have traditionally been thought to depend on people's will. Each of these studies focuses on a different aspect of our common moral and political life and shows, contrary to conventional opinion, that it does not depend on voluntary action or the exercise of a will constituted solely by rational thought. Together, the essays in this collection represent an effort to shift our understanding of the phenomena traditionally studied in moral and political philosophy from that of their being products of reason and will, operating independently of feeling and sentiment to that of their being manifestations of the work of emotion. (shrink)

Stocker intends this book to redress the common failures of contemporary moral philosophers to see the importance of emotions for their field. His aim is not merely to point out deficiencies in current thinking about emotions and their place in ethics, however. It is also to show how emotions are important for ethics. The book is divided into ten chapters, four of which are written in collaboration with Elizabeth Hegeman, an anthropologist and psychoanalyst. The first seven present criticisms of current (...) thinking and argue for some general theses about the way emotions are related to values. The last three examine specific emotions, notably, compassion, pity, pride, shame, and anger. They serve to substantiate the general theses about the way emotions are related to values that the first seven chapters promote. In this review I will concentrate on the material in these first seven chapters. Though some of it is jointly authored, I will for convenience' sake mostly refer just to Stocker as the author. (shrink)

We present a general framework for forcing on ω2 with finite conditions using countable models as side conditions. This framework is based on a method of comparing countable models as being membership related up to a large initial segment. We give several examples of this type of forcing, including adding a function on ω2, adding a nonreflecting stationary subset of, and adding an ω1‐Kurepa tree.

This book examines the central questions of ethics through a study of theories of right and wrong that are found in the great ethical works of Western philosophy. It focuses on theories that continue to have a significant presence in the field. The core chapters cover egoism, the eudaimonism of Plato and Aristotle, act and rule utilitarianism, modern natural law theory, Kant's moral theory, and existentialist ethics. Readers will be introduced not only to the main ideas of each theory but (...) to contemporary developments and defenses of those ideas. A final chapter takes up topics in meta-ethics and moral psychology. The discussions throughout draw the reader into philosophical inquiry through argument and criticism that illuminate the profundity of the questions under examination. Students will find this book to be a very helpful guide to how philosophical inquiry is undertaken as well as to what the major theories in ethics hold. (shrink)

Michael Bergmann has argued that internalist accounts of justification face an insoluble dilemma. This paper begins with an explanation of Bergmann’s dilemma. Next, I review some recent attempts to answer the dilemma, which I argue are insufficient to overcome it. The solution I propose presents an internalist account of justification through direct acquaintance. My thesis is that direct acquaintance can provide subjective epistemic assurance without falling prey to the quagmire of difficulties that Bergmann alleges all internalist accounts of justification cannot (...) surmount. (shrink)

This paper seeks to identify the distinctive moral wrong of stalking and argues that this wrong is serious enough to criminalize. We draw on psychological literature about stalking, distinguishing types of stalkers, their pathologies, and victims. The victimology is the basis for claims about what is wrong with stalking. Close attention to the experiences of victims often reveals an obsessive preoccupation with the stalker and what he will do next. The kind of harm this does is best understood in relation (...) to the value of privacy and conventionally protected zones of privacy. We compare anti-stalking laws in different jurisdictions, claiming that they all fail in some way to capture the distinctive privacy violation that stalking involves. Further reflection on the seriousness of the invasion of privacy it represents suggests that it is a deeply personal wrong. Indeed, it is usually more serious than obtrusive surveillance by states, precisely because it is more personal. Where state surveillance genuinely is as intrusive as stalking, it tends to adopt the tactics of the stalker, imposing its presence on the activist victim at every turn. Power dynamics —whether rooted in the power of the state or the violence of a stalker —may exacerbate violations of privacy, but the wrong is distinct from violence, threats of violence and other aggression. Nor is stalking a simple expression of a difference in power between stalker and victim, such as a difference due to gender. (shrink)

This article concerns the problems of proportionality in the theory of punishment. The problem is how to determine whether the severity of a punishment for a criminal offense is proportional to the seriousness of that offense. The resolution to this problem proposed in the article is that, first, one understand punishment as pain or loss intentionally and openly inflicted on someone S in retaliation for something S did, by a person or agent who is at least as powerful as S, (...) and, second, one take such retaliatory pain or loss as, within stable social groups, a means for preserving social order. Accordingly, it is argued that, on this proposal, the measure by which the severity of punishment is determined to be proportional to the seriousness of the crime for which it is inflicted is the minimal amount of pain or loss necessary to preserve social order. Sentencing policies that follow this measure, it is then observed, tend to yield less severe punishments than the policies that classical deterrence theory yields. Finally, the article offers an argument for regarding as morally more defensible sentencing policies whose goal is preserving social order than sentencing policies whose goal is that of classical deterrence theory, which is to achieve the smallest incidence of crimes consistent with not diminishing the overall welfare of society. (shrink)

Rights are commonly linked to responsibilities. One commonly hears remarks about the rights and responsibilities of teachers, parents, students, etc. This linking together of the two is the topic of this paper. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section I distinguish three accounts of the relation between rights and esponsibilities any of which we could have in mind when linking the two together, and I single out the third account for further study. Unlike the other two, (...) it seems to offer fresh material for the theory of rights. In the second section I develop this material. I explicate the general relation between rights and responsibilities as this third account represents it, and I specify the grounds for attributing such a relation to them. My aim here is to elucidate a conception of rights that certain legal and political rights can be taken to exemplify and that has been ignored or obscured in recent work in the theory of rights. In the last two sections I turn my attention to human rights. I argue in Section III that Locke's theory of natural rights can be interpreted as upholding the conception of rights elucidated in the preceding section, and I consider and criticize in Section IV an account of the relation between certain human rights and responsibilities that comes from Joel Feinberg's distinction between mandatory and discretionary rights. The arguments of these two sections are meant to strengthen the case for making room in the theory of rights for the conception elucidated in Section II. (shrink)

This paper uses a study of the opinions in a case recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., to explain the role of empathy in legal interpretation. I argue for two theses: (1) that empathy is essential to an interpretation of law if that interpretation is to serve the interests of justice and (2) that no interpretation of a law is sound if it ignores whether so interpreting the law serves the interests of (...) justice. (shrink)

This volume brings together philosophical essays on emotions by eleven leading thinkers in the field. The essays cover a variety of topics that relate emotions to humor, opera, theater, justice, war, death, our intellectual life, authenticity, personal identity, self-knowledge, and science.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the emergence of the analytic movement in British philosophy. It highlights G. E. Moore's two most influential works, ‘The Refutation of Idealism’ and Principia Ethica, both of which were seminal contributions to the analytic movement that he and Bertrand Russell initiated. Both feature the realist doctrine and the method of decompositional analysis that are the hallmarks of Moore's early philosophy. The discussions then turn to Moore's views about moral philosophy and Henry Sidgwick; (...) class='Hi'>John Cook Wilson, the most influential realist at Oxford; meta-ethics; and postwar ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 97-109 [Access article in PDF] Notes and Discussions Reply to Mark Murphy John Deigh Northwestern University 1. Hobbes put his ideas about ethics in the form of a theory of natural law. The core of this theory appears in chapters 14 and 15 of Leviathan. Those chapters contain a systematic exposition of the laws of nature that pertain to the (...) maintenance of social order. Hobbes began this exposition by defining a law of nature as a "general rule, found out by reason," and he concluded it by referring to the laws he had expounded as "dictates of reason." 1 What he meant in saying that these rules were found out by reason and were dictates of reason is the subject of some controversy. A common interpretation is that Hobbes, having previously advanced an egoistic theory of human motivation and having then affirmed that the ultimate end of voluntary actions is the actor's well-being, took the laws to be consequences of the determination of means to this end. A good example of this interpretation can be found in Sidgwick's Outlines of the History of Ethics. 2 Introducing his account of Hobbes's ethics, having first described Hobbes's psychology, Sidgwick writes, What, then, is the conduct that [according to Hobbes] ought to be adopted...? In the first place, since all voluntary actions of men tend to their own preservation or pleasure, it cannot be reasonable to aim at anything else; in fact, nature rather than reason fixes the end of human action, to which it is reason's function to show the means. Hence, if we ask why it is reasonable for any individual to observe the rules of social behavior that are commonly called moral, the answer is obvious that this is only indirectly reasonable, as means to his own preservation or pleasure. 3One can find other examples of this interpretation in the commentaries of prominent contemporary writers on Hobbes such as David Gauthier and Jean Hampton. 4The interpretation appears sound as long as one looks only at the chapters in Leviathan that contain the core of Hobbes's ethics. Once one examines earlier [End Page 97] chapters, however, problems emerge. In particular, it becomes clear that the interpretation does not fit the accounts of reason and the other powers of human cognition that Hobbes gave in these early chapters. Hobbes uses the first three chapters of Leviathan to develop an account of the cognitive powers human beings have in common with other animals, and in the next two chapters he then discusses the powers that, being the result of acquiring language and the capacity for speech, are unique to human beings. In chapter 5, he identifies reason with one of these powers. It is, he says, the faculty of reckoning with words and other symbols. 5 And in chapter 8, he divides human cognitive powers into two categories, natural wit and acquired wit, and places the faculties of imagination, judgment, and prudence in the former and that of reason in the latter. 6 Means-to-ends thinking, he makes clear, involves the combined exercise of powers that belong exclusively to the category of natural wit. It does not involve the exercise of reason. So unless one assumes that Hobbes abandoned the accounts of reason and the other powers of human cognition that he gave in Leviathan's early chapters, one cannot interpret him as having taken the contribution of means-to-ends thinking to the determination of the laws of nature as what qualifies them as general rules found out by reason or as dictates of reason. In other words, to accept this common interpretation of Hobbes's exposition of the natural law means attributing to Leviathan a fundamental incoherence between its early chapters and the chapters containing that exposition.I raised this problem for the interpretation in my article "Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan." 7 The problem, I argued, results from the supposition, which anyone giving this interpretation must make, that Hobbes, in defining the laws of... (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to present a new theory of synaptic function in the nervous system. The basis for this theory is the experimental demonstration that a nerve impulse assumes five different forms as it advances through the synaptic region, and that five basic mathematical operations have been identified as being involved in the transformation of one form into another form. As a result of these data, the synaptic region is regarded as a functional unit where information coming (...) to it is unpacked, processed, stored, and retrieved for transit to another synaptic region or effector site. The data also suggests that a nerve impulse is a bolus of energy, therefore, without substance; that it contains information coded in its shape or form; that it is precisely described mathematically. Furthermore, the data suggests synaptic regions process these nerve impulses by applying mathematical operations to them; that function in the synaptic region is highly stereotyped (programmed); that chemical substances are associated with the mathematical operations. The basic approach of this theory is to regard a significant portion of the nervous system as an interface between the external universe and man himself. As an interface, the nervous system receives and processes information from both the external universe and man himself in a programmed manner. The interface functions by converting the information it receives into a bolus of energy, the nerve impulse, then processes the bolus by converting it into numbers or functions and applying mathematical operation to it. (shrink)

The subject of this chapter is Hobbes’s theory of political obligation. The discussion focuses exclusively on the exposition of the theory in Leviathan. While commentators agree on the basic theme of Hobbes’s theory, that people become obligated to obey a sovereign through the covenants they make either to each other or to the sovereign, they disagree on what Hobbes took to be the grounds of this obligation. Some commentators hold that Hobbes bases the obligation on the third law of nature, (...) which they take to be a command of God’s and therefore universally obligatory. Others deny that any of the laws of nature are obligatory before the formation of a commonwealth and hold, instead, that Hobbes regarded the covenants people make either with each other or to the sovereign as alone sufficient to create an obligation to obey the sovereign. The chapter reviews these two interpretations and assesses their strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)

Populations in developed societies are rapidly aging: fertility rates are at all-time lows while life expectancy creeps ever higher. This is triggering a social crisis in which shrinking youth populations are required to pay for the care and retirements of an aging majority. Some people argue that by investing in the right kinds of lifespan extension technology – the kind that extends the healthy and productive phases of life – we can avoid this crisis (thereby securing a ‘longevity dividend’). This (...) chapter argues that this longevity dividend is unlikely to be paid if lifespan extension coincides with rampant technological unemployment. This does not mean that we should not pursue lifespan extension, but it does mean that the argument in its favor needs to rest on other grounds. After articulating these grounds, the chapter proceeds to consider the implications this has for our vision of the extended life, postwork utopia. It argues that this vision may need to be reconceived and suggests that one plausible reconception involves prioritizing the role of games in the well-lived life. (shrink)

This article concerns two themes in Bart Schultz's recent biography of Henry Sidgwick, Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe. The first is the importance of Sidgwick's conflict over his religious beliefs to the development of his thinking in The Methods of Ethics. I suggest that, in addition to the characteristics of Methods that Schulz highlights, the work's epistemology, specifically, Sidgwick's program of presenting ethics as an axiomatic system on the traditional understanding of such systems, is due to the conflict. The (...) second is the relative neglect into which Methods fell in the first part of the twentieth century, neglect Schultz attributes to changes in philosophical fashions and to the undue influence of the Bloomsbury literati on British intellectual culture. I suggest that there is a deeper explanation, which lies in Sidgwick's program of presenting ethics as an axiomatic system on the traditional understanding of such systems. Such programs, I argue, became obsolete in analytic philosophy owing to changes in how axiomatization in mathematics was understood that resulted initially from the rise of non-Euclidean geometries and ultimately from the collapse of Frege's and Russell's logicism. (shrink)

A new theory of synaptic function in the nervous system (Dempsher, 1978) is applied to the simplest system for integration of function in the nervous system. This system includes a sensory and motor neuron and three synaptic regions associated with those two neurons; a receptor region, an interneuronal spinal synaptic region linking the two neurons, and an effector region.Information is first received and processed at the receptor region. The processing consists of five components:1. A highly selective mechanism which allows only (...) that information to enter the receptor system which is appropriate. 2. The appropriateness of the information is determined by the alphabet (miniature potentials) already in that area. 3. The information entering the system is assembled in a pattern meaningful for the next processing operation. 4. The assembled information is then disassembled into its subunits and mapped into the alphabet (miniature potentials). 5. These miniature potentials are assembled into another pattern meaningful to fit the role of the receptor region. 6. This new pattern is repacked for transit to the central synaptic region. (shrink)

It seems that we are not willing to give up the intuitions that works of fiction are free from the constraints of historical truth and historical inaccuracies sometimes count against the artistic value of works of fiction. Christopher Bartel calls this the puzzle of historical criticism. I argue that this puzzle extends beyond historical facts. While it is especially salient that historical accuracy at times appears relevant to the evaluation of fictional works, such relevance appears to be a feature of (...) facts in general. I then propose a partial strategy for resolving the puzzle. (shrink)

Arguments in natural theology have recently increased in their number and level of sophistication. However, there has not been much analysis of the ways in which these arguments should be evaluated as good, taken collectively or individually. After providing an overview of some proposed goals and good-making criteria for arguments in natural theology, we provide an analysis that stands as a corrective to some of the ill-formed standards that are currently in circulation. Specifically, our analysis focuses on the relation between (...) the veracity of the premises and their relation to the conclusion of an argument. In addition to providing a clearer account of what makes an argument good, an upshot of our account is that there remain positive contributions for "weak" arguments, especially within cumulative case arguments in ramified natural theology. (shrink)

Daniel Dennett has argued that consciousness can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of physical entities and processes. In some of his most recent publications, he has made this case by casting doubts on purely conceptual thought experiments and proposing his own thought experiments to "pump" the intuition that consciousness can be physical. In this paper, I will summarize Dennett's recent defenses of physicalism, followed by a careful critique of his position. The critique presses two flaws in Dennett's defense of (...) physicalism. First, I will rebut his case against the traditional conceptual arguments against physicalism. Second, I will present some empirical grounds for thinking that a crucial move in the argument against physicalism is well-supported. For someone, like Dennett, who finds conceptual arguments dubious, the empirical findings make it exceptionally difficult to deny the anti-physicalist argument. (shrink)

This paper defends a Bayesian approach to confirming a miracle against Jordan Howard Sobel’s recent novel interpretation of Hume’s criticisms. In his book, ’Logic and Theism’, Sobel offers an intriguing and original way to apply Hume’s criticisms against the possibility of having sufficient evidence to confirm a miracle. The key idea behind Sobel’s approach is to employ infinitesimal probabilities to neutralize the cumulative effects of positive evidence for any miracle. This paper aims to undermine Sobel’s use of infinitesimal probabilities to (...) block a Bayesian approach to confirming a miracle. (shrink)

In numerous works, Alvin Plantinga argues that classical foundationalism is a failed theory of knowledge because of its self-referential incoherence. Plantinga's argument, however, fails to demonstrate that classical foundationalism is self-refuting. To bring this to light, I will review the form of Plantinga's argument in comparison with other examples of self-refutation. Upon closer inspection, it will be clear that classical foundationalism is not self-refuting, as Plantinga claims. Furthermore, I will expose another flaw in Plantinga's argument against classical foundationalism, which shows (...) at best that Plantinga's argument cannot be reconstructed to demonstrate that classical foundationalism is improbable. While Plantinga's argument may highlight a challenge for classical foundationalism, his argument does not establish the falsity ofclassical foundationalism, nor does it offer any other overriding reason to reject it. Thus, Plantinga's criticisms of classical foundationalism by themselves are not sufficient to rule out the theory's viability. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 (3) 2007: pp. 245-251. (shrink)

The problem of error is an old argument for atheism that can be found in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Although it is not widely discussed in the contemporary literature in the Philosophy of Religion, I resurrect it and give it a modern spin. By relying on empirical studies in moral psychology that demonstrate that moral judgments from human beings are generally susceptible to certain psychological biases, such as framing and order effects, I claim that if God is responsible for (...) making human beings such that we have these biases, this means that God is not a perfect being. The findings in empirical moral psychology create a problem for the existence of God, traditionally conceived. (shrink)

This anthology focuses on emotions and motives that relate to our status as moral agents, our capacity for moral judgement, and the practices that help to define our social lives. Attachment, trust, respect, conscience, guilt, revenge, depravity, and forgiveness are among the topics discussed. Collectively, the thirteen essays in this collection represent a time-honored tradition in ethics: the effort to throw light on fundamental questions concerning the complexities of the human soul.

Derek Parfit takes an externalist and cognitivist view about normative reasons. I shall explore this view and add some arguments that support it. But I shall also raise a doubt about it at the end.

The purpose of this paper is to present a bio-physical basis of mathematics. The essence of the theory is that function in the nervous system is mathematical. The mathematics arises as a result of the interaction of energy (a wave with a precise curvature in space and time) and matter (a molecular or ionic structure with a precise form in space and time). In this interaction, both energy and matter play an active role. That is, the interaction results in a (...) change in form of both energy and matter. There are at least six mathematical operations in a simple synaptic region. It is believed the form of both energy and matter are specific, and their interaction is specific, that is, function in most of the nervous system is stereotyped. It is suggested that mathematics be taken out of the mind and placed where it belongs — in nature and the synaptic regions of the nervous system; it results in both places from a precise interaction between energy (in a precise form) and matter (in a precise structure). (shrink)

This brief essay takes a look at Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), the English philosopher and social reformer, and his ideas about eugenics and dysgenics. It is evident from his works that like many other leading thinkers and social reformers of his time, Russell recognized the importance of genetics for human welfare and was deeply concerned about the dysgenic trends that he observed in his time. He included eugenics as an integral part of his moral philosophy and never abandoned the belief in (...) its importance, although he grew increasingly skeptical of some forms of genetic explanation and concerned about the real- world contexts of eugenic policies in his later years. (shrink)

This reply is a comment on the brief discussion of my article in Reisenzein and Stephan’s concluding article.

J. B. Schneewind's Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy surpassed all previous treatments of Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics by showing how Sidgwick's work follows a coherent plan of argument for a conception of ethics as grounded in practical reason. Schneewind offered his interpretation as the product of a historical rather than a critical study. This article undertakes a critical study of Sidgwick's work based on Schneewind's interpretation. Its thesis is that the conception of ethics for which Sidgwick argued is (...) incoherent. As a result, it is argued, the coherent plan of argument in the Methods that Schneewind disclosed masks a deep incoherence in the argument itself. Correspondence:c1 [email protected]. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive handbook in the philosophy of criminal law. It contains seventeen original essays by leading thinkers in the field and covers the field's major topics including limits to criminalization, obscenity and hate speech, blackmail, the law of rape, attempts, accomplice liability, causation, responsibility, justification and excuse, duress, provocation and self-defense, insanity, punishment, the death penalty, mercy, and preventive detention and other alternatives to punishment. It will be an invaluable resource for scholars and students whose research and (...) studies concern philosophical issues in criminal law and criminal law theory. (shrink)

In Marc. gr., classis XI,18 an anonymous florilegium consisting of selected paragraphs of the Second Part of the Fifth Division of the 3rd book of Thomas Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles is extant. These paragraphs were excerpted from the Greek translation of the Latin text by Demetrios Cydones and 106 ; ch. 101, § 2 partim; 103; ch. 94, § 3-5; 12-15). The main topic of this text is «fate». An edition of it is offered, and it is argued, on the (...) basis of its similarity with another florilegium Thomisticum of the professed Byzantine Thomist Georgios Scholarios - Gennadios II as well as with some of his writings, that it must be attributed to the same author. It should be probably placed in 1444/53 and regarded as part of Scholarios’ preparation for refuting Georgios Gemistos - Plethon’s Laws II,6, which from 1439 onwards was circulated independently as De fato. (shrink)